Type 1 summary of Sliwa
Paulina Sliwa intends to create an unified account of excuses (what excuses are and what excuses do) in her creation of the Good Intention Account. Sliwa defines excuses as considerations that show that an agent’s wrongdoing lacks a morally adequate present-directed intention and explains that excuses modify responsibility.
Before she dives into her attempt of a unified account of excuses she picks apart two existing accounts, the Obligation Account and the Character Account. Sliwa takes issue with the Obligation Account for its inability to distinguish between justification and excuse. She gives several examples of how this distinction matters. The Obligation Account has difficultly allowing agents to be excused even when they act impermissibly, as is the case with crimes committed under the guise of coercion or duress. The Oblication Account also doesnt take into account the way that emotional upset affects our moral obligatins and ability to act intentionally. The Character Account says that “an objectively wrong action… is excused if it does not manifest some defect of character” (8). The Character Account is an improvement to the Obligation Account because it is able to distrinshuish between justification and excuse, but it falters because it focuses on the overall general character someone possesses, while our focus with excuses is the mental state or character displayed in the moment that the action is done.
After examining the shortcomings of these two accounts, Sliwa explains in depth the Good Intention Account, which states that “excuses are considerations that show that the agent’s wrongdoing does not reflect her lack of a morally adequate present-directed intention” (9). The Good Intention Account traces our wrongdoing back to our agency and the limits placed upon it. Sliwa then demonstrates how this applies to various categories of excuses.
First, Sliwa applies this to excuses based in unintentionality. The Good Intention Account explains that ignorance is not an excuse because ignorance entails a lack of morally adequate intention. Negligence or ignorance do not constitute an excuse when they demonstrate a lack of a morally adequate intention such as checking the label of something to see if it is safe. If you didn’t intent to check the label, you serve your friend, and accidentally poison them, then your negligence is not excused! The same goes for recklessness. Recklessness is not an excuse because it constitutes a lack of morally adequate intention.
Second, Sliwa applies the Good Intention Account to excuses based in moral ignorance, which is the result of recklessness or negligence in one’s moral inquiry. When an intention is viewed very narrowly, it can be difficult to assess the moral adequacy it possesses. Sliwa suggests that an intention for moral adequacy assessed relative to a goal (viewing the intention with a macro lens if you will) makes it clear whether or not the agent’s actions demonstrate a lack of morally adequate intentions and thus whether or not they are excusable. By placing intention in context, we get a fuller picture about the moral adequacy of an agent’s intentions. However, when the relevant moral goal at hand changes, our assessment of the moral adequacy of their intentions changes. Sliwa then clarifies her position: “The Good Intention Account thus says that a morally ignorant agent can sometimes have an excuse without saying that all instances of wrongdoing done from moral ignorance are excused” (18).
Then Sliwa explains that The Good Intention Account excuses an agent who is caught in a moral dilemma because her wrongdoing reflects two wrongdoing- causing options rather than a lack of morally adequate intentions.
Fourth, Sliwa applies this to excuses based on the loss of self-control. Duress, coercion, and stress can be excuses because they cause an agent to lose self-control, which “is the ability to put one’s present-directed intentions into action in the face of contrary desires”. The loss of self-control is a valid excuse because your intention can no longer guide your action. When you lose self-control, your intentions remain but your momentary desires guide your action instead of your intentions. Leading up to the point of loss of self control is the erosion of self control, which requires increasing amounts of effort to act upon your intentions. Wrongness resulting from the loss of self control doesn’t reflect the lack of morally adequate intentions because the agent loses the ability to translate her present-directed intentions into action.
After responding to objections to the Good Intention Account which ultimately solified the distinction between and the relationship of excuse and justification, it is clear that the Good Intention Account can explain the dynamics of excuses and their impact on blameworthiness. The validity of an excuse hinges on the intentions of the agent. If the agent has good intentions and makes a plan to achieve those intentions, but emotional conditions such as duress or coercion cause the agent to be guided by momentary desires instead of their intentions. In a scenario like this, the wrongful action committed does not necessarily demonstrate that the agent has a lack of morally adequate intentions. Their intentions are present but are unable to guide their actions because of the conditions that create excuse.
